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Medicine can be done at very different levels. So, physical, biochemical, 
biological, and social medicine are disciplines that count with a large theoretical 
background. This multilevel approach is applicable to psychiatry too. The 1990s 
of the twentieth century was “The Decade of the Brain.” It helped to conceive 
psychiatry as “biological psychiatry” in a mechanistic reductionist epistemology 
that has become the canonical paradigm for the speciality. But this perspec-
tive came across a problem. Psychiatric facts were defined in subjective terms, 
while the proposed models for this type of pathology were expressed attending 
to biological mechanisms without clear interlevel constructs for establishing 
associations between biology and subjective experiences or behavioral patterns. 
Although symptoms are subjective in a radical manner, associations do not 
appear in this way. Some kind of “incommensurability” appears between what 
we want to explain and the arguments we propose to. The price paid for the “hard 
objective” approximation of biological psychiatry is to replace subjective patho-
logical experiences with mere objective indicators of them. In this chapter, we 
propose an alternative epistemological strategy by relying on “philosophically-
oriented phenomenological psychopathology” (POPP) for the rigorous study 
of pathological subjectivity. A neuroscience-based anthropological psychiatry 
(NBAP) built on ten concepts is introduced.
Keywords: psychiatry, philosophical anthropology, phenomenology, philosophy of 
psychiatry, neurophenomenology, semantics
1.  Introduction: the roots of the “philosophically-oriented 
phenomenological psychopathology”
In the last four decades, three paradigms deserve to be highlighted as models to 
be applied for the mental disorders.
The first one was diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders, third 
edition (DSM-III), emerging in the 1980s of the past century. It represented a 
nosological perspective which tried to be compatible with various other models 
(i.e. psychological, sociological) in addition to the medical one. Further actualiza-
tions of the DSM classification arrived at its last version, DSM-V, in 2013. The 
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International Classification of Diseases (ICD), at present in its 11th edition, cor-
responds, in essence, with DSM regarding to mental disorders.
The DSM was inspired in the Research Diagnostic Criteria of Robert Spitzer and 
other “neo-Kraepelinians,” who tried to operationalize some subjective pathological 
experiences they obtained from the classical psychiatric nosology. DSM had a logi-
cal positivistic inspiration with the intention of being neutral about the postulated 
mechanisms for mental disorders. It is believed that the philosopher of science Carl 
Hempel influenced in the conception of DSM [1], but his true influence is now being 
discussed [2]. However, DSM supposed a determined attempt to operationalize the 
clinical work of the tradition that transits from Kraepelin to Jaspers and Schneider [3]. 
Kurt Schneider, as the main referent of the Heidelberg school, received the French 
and German tradition of the classical psychiatry and transferred this knowledge to the 
United Kingdom after World War II. The role played by Wilhelm Mayer-Gross in this 
tradition exportation to the Anglo-Saxon area was definitive [4].
Jaspers’ General Psychopathology is undoubtedly the foundational text of 
theoretical psychiatry, namely psychopathology. But, although it is frequently 
argued that with this text phenomenology was introduced in psychopathology, 
the Husserlian method had less influence in Jaspers’ thinking when compared 
with the impact that the differentiation between explaining and understanding of 
Dilthey had. Therefore, the Jasperian-Schneiderian psychopathology that inspired 
DSM should not be considered as radically phenomenological in Husserlian terms. 
Rather, the Jasperian theory proposes a methodological pluralism [5, 6] that bets 
for a psychopathological analysis that simultaneously explains and understands the 
complexity of any mental symptom. That complexity is mentioned by Mayer-Goss 
when writing on the diagnosis of schizophrenia in 1938 [7]:
“In psychological medicine we cannot proceed, as in general medicine, by collect-
ing signs and symptoms and fitting them into a sort of jig-saw puzzle. All the symp-
toms have to be related to the psychological background against which they appear.”
Neutrality was one of the main strengths of the DSM model. But it was turned 
into the focus of many critics in the last two decades, as DSM was vulnerable to 
manipulation by economic interests. Criticism against DSM has markedly increased 
over its successive editions [1]. The suspicion of fabricating spurious diseases which 
could be meaty objectives for the pharmaceutical market severely threatened the 
scientific value of DSM in the twenty-first century. Hence, nowadays, the idea that 
DSM is over has taken root.
As a response to the critics to DSM based on its epistemic vulnerabilities, a second 
paradigm has been trying to be implanted since 2008: The Research Domain Criteria 
project (RDoC). RDoC is an initiative of the National Institute of Mental Health 
(NIMH), first led by Thomas Insel, director of the NIMH. This initiative proposes to 
“develop, for research purposes, new ways of classifying mental disorders based on 
dimensions of observable behaviour and neurobiological measures” [8].
DSM classification is categorical and uses operationalization of subjective expe-
riences. RDoC, on the other hand, differs from DSM in three main points: (1) RDoC 
proposes the use of dimensions instead of categories, (2) RDoC orients the core of 
the model toward domains or constructs with neurocognitive validity, abandoning 
the priority of interrater reliability that is a characteristic in DSM, and (3) RDoC 
intends to be a useful tool for research rather than a disease classificatory system. 
The change made from DSM-ICD model to the RDoC paradigm in the last decade 
has been characterized as an Aristotelian to Galilean turn. The DSM classification, 
which reifies mental disorders as natural categories of diseases (the Aristotelian 
perspective), has been substituted by the RDoC point of view, where biological 
and neurocognitive domains compound the matrix around which projecting new 
research programs (the Galilean perspective) [9].
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Third, a phenomenological-based paradigm begins with the first years of the 
twenty-first century by the hand of Parnas and Zahavi [10] and other psychopa-
thologists, which were hardly ascribed to the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl 
and who claim for an explicit philosophical foundation for psychopathology. They 
differentiate three uses of the term “phenomenology.” The first one is that of the 
contemporary Anglo-Saxon psychiatric use, referring “phenomenology” to the 
mere “description of signs and symptoms of mental disorders.” A second meaning 
would be the more restrictive use of the term in Jaspers, where phenomenology 
is “a study of inner experience.” Finally, the third use of the term, the one Parnas 
and Zahavi defend, is the “endeavor inspired by phenomenological philosophy.” 
Three are the most significant philosophers in this tradition, whose main texts were 
published over the middle years of the twentieth century: Edmund Husserl, Martin 
Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty [11]. To disambiguate between the three 
uses of the term “phenomenology” in psychiatry, we will refer to this third meaning 
as “philosophically-oriented phenomenological psychopathology” (POPP), which 
constitutes, from our point view, the paradigm closer to an anthropological founda-
tion of psychiatry.
Notice that POPP takes consciousness as the core function of the human brain 
functioning and that it is in consciousness where the psychopathological facts 
occur. POPP is, therefore, close to the “organo-dynamic theory” of mental illness 
of the French psychiatrist Henry Ey [12] as well as to Agustín Jimeno’s “integral 
psychopathology,” developed in Spain [13]. A kind of POPP has been extensively 
developed by Parnas et al. [11] around the psychopathology of schizophrenia, lead-
ing to the development of new instruments as EASE. Examination of anomalous 
self-experience (EASE) is a checklist for semi-structured, phenomenological explo-
ration of subtle aspects of consciousness experience, described by Huber, Gross, 
Süllwold, Klosterkötter, and others [14] in the prodromal phase of schizophrenia. 
A second instrument, examination of anomalous world experience (EAWE) [15], 
has been recently developed by Sass and others with the same POPP orientation as 
EASE. In the case of EAWE, the exploration is not oriented to the inner space of the 
self, but to the outer world. Although EAWE was developed to be used in schizo-
phrenic populations, it can be applied to other types of clinical groups too.
Organo-dynamic theory, integral psychopathology, EASE, and EAWE are four 
examples of the “Philosophically-Oriented Phenomenological Psychopathology” 
(POPP) we want to defend as a good model of psychopathology, which is coher-
ent with anthropology. POPP will be the theoretical base of an anthropological 
psychiatry.
These are the four attributes that, in our perspective, characterize POPP: con-
sciousness, phenomenology, semantics, and disintegration of semantics.
1. Consciousness: Consciousness is the dynamically structured global integrative 
function of the human being. Consciousness is the higher order homeostatic 
function of the human biology in an intersubjective social environment.
2. Phenomenology: The phenomenological method, first described by Husserl 
and later developed by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and others, is a good philo-
sophical method to the rigorous study of consciousness. The hermeneutical 
phenomenology of Heidegger [16] has interesting developments in psycho-
therapy [17]. Neurophenomenology, based in Merleau-Ponty’s work, is appli-
cable to neuroscience-oriented research of consciousness [18].
3. Semantics: Consciousness is a system composed of elements characterized to 
be meaning carrying entities. Following Fuster [19], we will name “cognit” 
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every element of the consciousness which is the minimal unit of semantics and 
that corresponds to a neural network. Cognits have mental properties in terms 
of the “psicons” as proposed by Bunge [20, 21]. Cognits are the element, both 
of conscious thinking and of language. Therefore, sharing equivalent cognits is 
the base for common sense or semantics in language and for intersubjectivity.
4. Disintegration of semantics: It is the key concept in psychopathology. Either 
in the personal attribution of relevance and significance to every cognit in the 
frame of a meaningful consciousness state, in an intersubjective dialog, or in 
a significant behavior, the elements of the consciousness must be capable of 
being integrated under a hermeneutically global sense. In the opposite case, 
the semantics of that conscious state can be denoted as psychopathological, 
lacking semantics, or senseless.
2. Neuroscience-based anthropological psychiatry
2.1 From POPP to NBAP
Once we have argued why to use a concrete psychopathological model, the 
POPP, and which are the four main attributes that characterizes it, two consider-
ations must be explained: (1) its relationship whit the other mentioned psycho-
pathological models and (2) its usefulness in anthropological psychiatry.
First, POPP is compatible with both DSM-ICD and RDoC models. POPP 
explores subtle aspects of consciousness experience, while DSM-ICD refers to 
unspecific verbal informs or to behavioral patterns. So POPP can be subsumed by 
DSM-ICD model, even though POPP aims to be a more exact and specific model 
while DSM-ICD sacrifices psychopathological fineness in favor of a massive 
epidemiological use. Although POPP and RDoC have different foundations (phe-
nomenological the first and scientific positivist the second), its core constructs can 
be jointly studied under a correlational perspective. This is, precisely, the method 
that neurophenomenology proposes. The first-person perspective (or subjective 
phenomenological perspective) and the zero-person perspective (or objective 
scientific natural perspective) are both the dual approaching to any cognit. The 
neurophenomenological correlation makes the integration of both perspectives 
possible. This question will be further discussed at point 2.2.5. Note that in Anglo-
Saxon literature, it is common to refer to the “zero-person perspective” as “third-
person perspective.” We prefer the term “zero-person” to denote that it is referred 
to an impersonal or objective (belonging to an object not a person) perspective. 
Phenomenological perspective in third person is not more than a first-person 
perspective after changing the ubication in the subjective space of the speaking 
subject to the subjective space of a third person. I thank the phenomenologist Javier 
San Martin for this observation on zero-person and third-person perspectives.
Second, we must aboard the question of why is POPP preferable for anthropo-
logical psychiatry or, in other words, why is anthropological psychiatry preferable 
for taking advantage of the phenomenological psychopathological tradition. The 
answer is that phenomenology is the philosophical foundation of both traditions: 
the psychopathological and the anthropological. Drawing from common sources 
will be the better guarantee for the consistence of the model.
The Spanish psychopathologist Demetrio Barcia defines anthropological 
psychiatry as the psychiatry which conceives that mental disease is an event that 
occurs in a human being ([22], p. 12). Following a perspective of philosophy of 
science, we have defined in a previous paper [13] anthropological psychiatry as the 
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anthropological modeling of psychiatry. The first great incursion in this area was 
done by Ludwig Binswanger [23], and Otto Dörr has developed which is prob-
ably the most recent important systematic project of an explicit anthropological 
psychiatry [24]. Pelegrina [25, 26] makes a similar impressive recent work focusing 
not in psychiatry but in psychopathology. Once the former has been mentioned 
as paradigmatic examples, it is not our objective to systematically revise the many 
systems that can fall under the concept of anthropological psychiatry. We only want 
to point out that the majority, if not the totality of them, are before the conception 
of neurophenomenology as a bridge discipline between neuroscience and phenom-
enology. The model we propose, Neuroscience-Based Anthropological Psychiatry 
(NBAP), is an attempt to integrate recent neuroscience models in to the tradition of 
anthropological psychiatry.
The objective of this chapter, which will be developed in Section 2.2., is to pres-
ent 10 concepts, introduced as 10 progressive steps, to characterize NBAP.
2.2 Ten introductory steps to NBAP
2.2.1 Phenomenology: the rigorous study of subjectivity
Modern science begins during the sixtieth and seventieth centuries by the lead-
ing hand of Galileo and Newton. The differentiation that Descartes did between 
res cogitans and res extensa facilitated the autonomy of empirical science from the 
philosophical speculation. The advance of the diverse scientific disciplines until 
the twentieth century gave rise to the idea that has been known as the spirit of 
Modernity. According to this, a unique objective reality exists. Its exact representa-
tion, preferably in mathematical terms, is the task of science. All the parcels of the 
unified science, from physics to psychology, must stick this presupposes if they 
want to be considered as scientific knowledge.
But, in the turn of nineteenth to twentieth centuries, a profound debate was 
sustained in the core of logic, psychology, and physics. The core of the problem 
was to delimitate what should be taken as the basic data of empiricism to construct 
any scientific argumentation. The discussion between Gottlob Frege and Edmund 
Husserl on the concept of number propitiated that the second began the way of 
phenomenology as the science of the essences. Phenomenology does not accept the 
idea that any mental concept is a representation of reality. Conversely, any mental 
content is the fact toward which the method of the phenomenological scientist 
must be oriented. “Back to the things themselves” was the slogan of Husserl and the 
phenomenological school in Germany in the first third of the twentieth century.
Phenomenology was the object of the critics of Rudolph Carnap and other 
philosophers of the science from the “Circle of Viena.” Phenomenology was taken as 
an example of metaphysical nonsense, leading to a profound orientation in psychol-
ogy toward facts nondependent on subjectivity, mainly the expressed behavior. The 
behavior observed in animals and humans under experimental conditions substi-
tutes the mental experience as the focus of interest of most of the psychologists. 
In this context, which spread the central decades of the past century, the paradox 
occurred that scientific psychology took a rout while psychopathology remained 
inspired in the phenomenological origins of Jaspers and posteriorly the Heidelberg 
school. The picture complicates due to transactions between phenomenology and 
psychoanalysis that we cannot analyze here.
Phenomenological descriptions have been diverse in authors and perspectives 
over a great part of the past century. But this research was not placed at a central 
place in the academic psychiatry which, with the DSM-III era, evolved to a domi-
nant biological mechanistic paradigm. It was during the turn to the present century 
Psychopathology - An International and Interdisciplinary Perspective
6
when phenomenology was revisited and revaluated in the neuroscientific landscape 
[19] as well as in the psychopathological research [27]. Nowadays, a privileged 
circumstance allows us to reread the classical phenomenological descriptions. 
The umbrella of neuroscientist models allows us to subsume under them, at least 
in part, the classic phenomenology. The rigor of the descriptions of mental states 
in first person can be correlated with fine neurophysiological and neuroimage 
technics under common theoretical models. Moreover, the research program based 
on the topic of the mind as a black box has converged, via cognitive behaviors, to a 
renewed interest in mental events.
2.2.2  Phenomenological anthropology: the conditions of possibility of the human 
being
The question about the human being was one of the main challenges the modern 
thinking proposed. Kant was the enlightened thinker who, under the inspiration of 
Rousseau, initiated an explicit anthropological thinking. But the rational knowing 
on the human essence and its empirical characterization showed the difficulties 
and disadvantages consequent to applying the mechanistic models of the modern 
science to anthropological questions. Since the twentieth century, the anthropologi-
cal inquires divide, between others, into three main streams: physical anthropology, 
cultural anthropology or ethnography, and philosophical anthropology.
Philosophical anthropology is the discipline we will focus on. Max Scheler, 
a philosopher who was initially ascribed to the Husserlian school, proposed for 
the first time the discipline in the 1920s of the twentieth century. After him, the 
discipline has become a philosophy of anthropology [28] in a similar way as a 
philosophy of psychology or a philosophy of medicine exists. But it is important to 
highlight a difference; while philosophy of medicine and philosophy of psychology 
mainly come from the analytical, positivistic, or Anglo-Saxon tradition in phi-
losophy, philosophy of anthropology relates to the continental or phenomenology 
hermeneutical tradition. Nonetheless, currently both traditions are quickly mixing 
and enriching each other.
So, in the dotation of NBAP we have, now, phenomenology as a method for the 
rigorous study of subjectivity and philosophical anthropology as a framework in 
which to locate the empirical research regarding the human being. In this context, 
three specific questions can be done: (1) does the human condition change when 
sick? (2) which are the specific anthropological attributes of being a mentally ill  
person? and (3) how does the philosophy of the human being resolve the mind-brain 
and the identity-body problems? Further, these three questions will be addressed.
2.2.3 Anthropological medicine: a sick man and a doctor in a narrative circle
Medicine as we know it was born in essence with Hippocrates and his school 
on the fifth century BC. Before that time, medical practice touched the magical 
thinking and did not clearly differentiate from religion. But with Hippocratic 
medicine, disease, therapeutics, and the sick person-physician relationship 
changed to be inspired in the two complementary concepts of isonomy and 
philanthropy. The first of these concepts indicates that every citizen in Athens 
was equal under the law. The second principle, that specifically takes the form 
of medical philía [29], complements the former by virtue of helping others to 
achieve and to enjoy the condition of citizenship and, specifically, helping them 
to recover their health by means of medical science and art. Moreover, the ancient 
Greek cities stipulated the manutention of a physician in each one of them to 
protect the health of its inhabitants.
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Although it seems obvious that modern medicine differs in many aspects from 
the ancient Greek medicine, mainly due to scientific and technological advances, 
we want to highlight that the core of it persists over the years since the times of 
Hippocrates. This core of the medical fact is no other than the patient-physician 
relationship.
After the scientific development of medicine that took place with the develop-
ment of the clinic method in the university hospitals of the nineteenth century, 
medicine became a technical-scientific discipline even more, eclipsing its nuclear 
interpersonal essence. But the work of Freud and its followers was a revulsive to the 
very modern perspective of the medicine that predominated during the positivist 
attitude of the second half of the nineteenth century. With Freud, the patient-
physician relationship turns to the focus of medicine, now under the name of 
“transference.”
It is around this rescued reality of intersubjectivity in medicine where the 
anthropological medicine of Viktor von Weizsäcker should be considered [30, 
31]. The work of Viktor von Weizsäcker is mainly located at Heidelberg in the 
1930s–1950s of the past century. He was a doctor, specialist in internal medicine 
and in neurology as well as a philosopher whose original thinking was inspired by 
psychoanalyzes, phenomenology, and philosophical anthropology. von Weizsäcker 
stressed that the sick person has a biography the doctor must take in account to the 
rigorous understanding of the where, when, what, and why of any disease. This 
anthropological perspective is not opposite, but complementary, with the technical-
scientific one. The integration of both perspectives led to a global comprehension of 
the sickness condition. The “pathic” dimension of the human being (the emotional 
nonconscious coming from the body) integrates with the “ontic” one (the rational 
conscious coming from the rational mind) in a circle of Gestalt or configuration 
(Gestaltkreis). This configurative circle unifies both the “solidarity of death” and 
the “reciprocity of life” in a way that radically includes disease and death with 
health and life, remarking the idea that sickness is consubstantial to the human 
being. In this scene, the role of the physician far to “fight against the death” is “pact 
with the death.” After von Weizsäcker, the patient-physician relationship has been 
profoundly theorized by Laín Entralgo [29].
The patient-physician relationship has become the axis or nuclear construct 
around which present medical theory is constructed. From a reification of diseases 
as mere natural regularities remaining at the center of a play where the doctor is the 
active agent while the patient passively remains as “the land where the battle takes 
place,” contemporary medicine has evolved to a “narrative dialog” [32]. Patient 
and physician now dialog and jointly assume risks and take decisions considering 
the data provided by evidence-based knowledge. We are in an ethical context of 
autonomy and responsibility [33], not yet in the paternalism that accompanied the 
mechanistic medicine of the “diseases as natural species.” Anthropological medicine 
will undoubtedly help in the construction of the dialogic intersubjective patient-
physician relationship which present medicine claims for.
2.2.4 Anthropological psychiatry: medicine of the subjectivity
The phenomenological anthropological perspective in medicine has been 
intensively applied in psychiatry [34]. Ludwig Binswanger, a Swedish psychiatrist 
contemporary of von Weizsäcker, integrates in his “existential analysis” [23] some 
aspects of the psychoanalytical tradition for the analysis of the Dasein, the con-
struct that subsumes the human being under the point of view of the Heideggerian 
hermeneutical phenomenology. Many psychiatrists followed the trail that 
Binswanger initiated in his application of philosophical anthropology to psychiatry. 
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Wolfgang Blankenburg applied the phenomenological analysis under a Husserlian 
perspective to the self-experience of schizophrenia. He proposed that the phenom-
enological key of this condition is the “loss of the natural evidence” in relation with 
the world [35]. Hubertus Tellenbach, applying the phenomenological method, 
described the “Typus melancholicus” that he characterizes by order attachment, 
strong moral conscience, intolerance to the ambiguity, and hypernomy-heteronomy. 
These phenotypical traits would predispose to endogenous depression.
Many other original proposes were done mainly in the German area, which 
located the very different ways the Heideggerian Dasein has to be in the world. 
These fine observations of the very different modes that the human existence has 
for expressing himself progressively erased the frontier between “normality” and 
mental illness. Outside the German area, in his classical book “The divided self” 
[36], the Scottish psychiatrist Ronald Laing finally proposed to solve that frontier 
doing comprehensible the madness using the method of the existential analysis. 
The barriers had been demolished, and the antipsychiatry arguments were knock-
ing on the door whipped by Foucault.
From Binswanger to Foucault, medical anthropology embarked on a trip after 
which the classical image of the human being, and, also, his existential reformula-
tion, arrived at a postmodern subject who will be progressively diluted in language 
and the social structure to definitively arrive to Lacan. This transgression is enough 
to illustrate the very diverse ways that the anthropological map can conduct the 
contemporary conception of the human being as a subject.
2.2.5 Neurophenomenology: the world-brain-mind system
The “naturalization of phenomenology” [37] became a new topic with the dif-
fusion of the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s works in the second half 
of the twentieth century. His theory propitiated “the body turn” of phenomenology, 
placing the human body at the center of the perception of the world. But not only 
the body as the lived axis of the world but the body, and more exactly the brain in its 
relationship with consciousness and subjectivity, has been taking center stage in the 
philosophical anthropology of the new millennium.
This naturalization and turn to the brain have implicated the broad territory of 
philosophy of the mind. In the analytical tradition, this reorientation has resulted 
in the concept of “neurophilosophy,” led by the philosophers Patricia and Paul 
Churchland [38]. As a response, or a complement, the neuroscientist and phenom-
enologist Francisco Varela proposed in 1996 the concept of “neurophenomenology” 
[18, 39], by which he wanted to tackle the “hard problem” of consciousness. In his 
seminal work [18], Varela clarifies:
“the Working Hypothesis of Neurophenomenology: Phenomenological accounts 
of the structure of experience and their counterparts in cognitive science relate to 
each other through reciprocal constraints.”
Complementary to the construct of neurophenomenology, Varela proposed a 
second fundamental concept: “enaction.” It implies a deep reconceptualization of 
problems being classically addressed by the cognitive sciences, so that enaction can 
be taken as a serious alternative to the concept of representative cognition. Writes 
Varela [37], p. 272:
“My overall approach to cognition is based on situated, embodied agents. I have 
introduced the name enactive to designate this approach more precisely. It com-
prises two complementary aspects: (1) the ongoing coupling of the cognitive agent, 
a permanent coping that is fundamentally mediated by sensorimotor activities; 
and (2) the autonomous activities of the agent whose identity is based on emerg-
ing, endogenous configurations (or self-organizing patterns) of neuronal activity. 
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Enaction implies that sensorimotor coupling modulates, but does not determine, an 
ongoing endogenous activity that it configures into meaningful world items in an 
unceasing flow.”
As we can see, the idea of self-organization of the mind processes reappears in 
Varela in a similar way we saw when mentioning the Gestaltkreis in von Weizsäcker. 
Self-organization of mind processes appear as a key concept too in the model 
proposed by another seminal author we want to mention: Joaquín M. Fuster. In his 
book of 2003, Cortex and Mind [19], Fuster introduces two concepts which can be 
very helpful to a neuroscience-based anthropological psychiatry: the cognit and the 
perception-action cycle. This is how Fuster defines both ideas:
“To characterize the cognitive structure of a cortical network, I use the term cognit, 
a generic term for any representation of knowledge in the cerebral cortex. A cognit is 
an item of knowledge about the world, the self, or relations between them.” (p. 14).
“Earlier I alluded to long connections from posterior cortical areas to areas of the 
frontal lobe. These connections constitute the functional linkage between the two 
cortical hierarchies, one for perception in posterior cortex and the other for action 
in frontal cortex. The lowest stages of both hierarchies are the cortical processing 
areas at the interface between the cortex and the environment: sensory cortex at the 
input interface and motor cortex at the output interface. In the course of behaviour, 
the two hierarchies are engaged in a cybernetic cycle of dynamic interactions with 
the environment that I have termed the perception-action cycle”. (p. 74).
“The cognitive interactions of a primate with the surrounding world are 
governed by what I have named the perception-action cycle [40]. This interac-
tive cycle is the extension to cortical processes of a basic principle of biology that 
characterizes the dynamic adaptation of an organism to its environment. It was first 
proposed by the biologist Uexküll [41], who deduced it from behavioral observa-
tions in a large number of animal species. Essentially, it can be stated as follows. An 
animal’s behavior consists of a succession of adaptative motor reactions to changes 
in its external and internal environments.” (pp. 107–108).
To summarize the approximation to NBAP we are doing from Sections 2.2.1 to 
2.2.5, anthropology is the discipline that specifically studies the human being. It 
needs to achieve symbolic facts, which are presented as subjective mental states. 
The rigorous study of the mental states implies accounting for the system compos-
ited by the human animal, its historical and cultural narrative, and the intersubjec-
tive and physical medium where he or she lives. By “rigorous study,” we mean both 
the explication and the comprehension. “Elucidating” could be a term that includes 
both significances. Different traditions termed diversely this system: Gestalkrise, 
perception-action system, hermeneutics. They are not synonymous terms, but 
they share an attribute definitory of the living things: self-organization or in the 
Maturana’s classical term “autopoiesis.” So the human being is an autopoietic system 
composited by symbolic elements (namely, semantic elements or cognits). This 
fragile system emerges in a concrete cultural and physical environment with which 
the person makes semantic and physical transactions to the moment of its disinte-
gration due to death. Medical processes are those where a high risk of disintegration 
exists. Psychiatric processes, for its part, are those where the risk of disintegration 
mainly appears in the semantic aspects of the system.
The philosopher of science Mario Bunge proposes a scientific metaphysical [42] 
system based, among others, on the concept of “system.” Following the ontology 
of Bungean’s scientific metaphysics, we propose that a human being is the system 
characterized by the following: (1) Its “components” are cognits, which we define 
as neural networks self-poetically emerging; (2) the “environment” of any human 
system is the semiotic context where it develops; (3) cognits dynamically stabilize 
by virtue of biological “mechanisms” needed by the whole integrity of the body 
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to maintain its fragile integrity; and (4) the “structure” of a human system is in 
part common to all the human beings (see below “the personal matrix”) while it 
is in part idiosyncratic as well (personal character or self-identity). Note that (3) 
refers to neurobiology, (1) to semantics, (2) is related with linguistics, and (4) 
corresponds to philosophical anthropology. This ontology satisfies what García [43] 
proposes for any theoretical model designed to be applicable to complex systems, 
which must be compatible with different scientific disciplines. So defining a human 
being as a kind of system facilitates our objective with respect to NBAP, as the 
model is applicable to the anthropological processes targeted as “normal,” “physi-
ological,” or “ethnographic” as well as to the other that tradition qualifies as “patho-
logical.” In other work, we propose a similar systemic approach to the problem of 
putatively defining humanity in artificial systems [44]. In our view, basing neuro-
phenomenology in Bunge’s scientific ontology implies a significant advantage over 
which modeling NBPA.
2.2.6 The personal matrix: mapping subjectivity
The great majority of people share a conjunct of attributes or dimensions that 
can be accepted as “universals” in the human being. Every person can be ascribed to 
a numeric or categorical value in the attributes of age, gender, language, or ethnic 
group. These four attributes would be ethnographic axes as a part of a personal 
matrix that could count with multiple other dimensions.
The ethnographic or “cultural universals” just mentioned are easy to apprehend 
in a first approximation to the problem. But the phenomenological work really 
begins when we try to extract the common subjective dimensions that “transcen-
dentally” structures human systems in people from different cultures and epochs. 
This is what might be called “positive or empirical phenomenological research.” To 
illustrate this idea, following a canonical text [45], we can mention some classical 
dimensions, axes, or topics in phenomenology each one of those could be a dimen-
sion of the personal matrix: that is, bodily intentionality, self-consciousness and 
world-consciousness, epistemic commonality and truth, or time experience.
In other work [46], we defined a matrix composed by eight phenomenological 
dimensions (four related with time and four related with space) and four limits to 
the phenomenological experience. The time dimensions are as follows: morality, 
the ongoing task, desire, and hope. Every one of these dimensions can be explored 
when we try to “anthropologically elucidate” a person. Morality is the system of 
behavioral patterns that constitute us before any intentional act. The task ongoing 
is the one that makes me feel an intentional subject. Desire is a behavioral pattern at 
present activated but still not closed in a perception-action cycle. Hope is a behav-
ioral pattern I recognize as desirable but presently inactive. The space dimensions 
are the body as entrails, the body as flesh, circumstance, and landscape. Body as 
entrails is the experience of the emotional response of the body (anger, joyful-
ness, and so on). Body as flesh refers to the experience of the body as the organism 
that accompanies my biographical live and where my subjectivity is embodied. 
Circumstance is the environment composed by the other people and by the artificial 
objects I interact with in my present intentional acts. The landscape is composed 
by the living beings and inorganic materials I can see or imagine but with which 
I am not at present interacting and which stay as a mere environment of my lived 
experience. The four limits of the phenomenological experience are death, absence, 
self, and mind.
A rich phenomenological elucidation is documented of any of these and much 
other similar phenomenological concepts. The positive work of the phenomenolo-
gist community from Husserl to date is the rigorous description of the fabric over 
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which the structure of the human being emerges, as well as the very different 
characteristic variants that it takes in every individual person. Additionally, a 
priority for the near future would be to establish correlations between the main 
phenomenological concepts and the intrinsic connectivity brain networks [47]. 
Attending to a neurophenomenological framework, a desirable research agenda in 
neurophenomenology would be to describe the personal phenomenological matrix 
in terms of visual (landscape), somatomotor (ongoing task), dorsal attention 
(circumstance), ventral attention (morality, desire, and hope), limbic (body as 
entrails), frontoparietal (body as flesh), default (self and mind).
2.2.7 Semantics: sharing personal fields
“The mind is intentional,” affirms a topic of the phenomenology coming from 
the pre-Husserlian days of Brentano. Every subjective experience has an object 
toward which the mind is projected. In a perception-action cycle, the motor system 
is projected to the world, executing an intentional plan. When two or more people 
share an objective, they form a system and share a global intentional motor plan. So, 
the association of this intentional motor plan to a motor verbal behavior is facili-
tated while a verbal sound appears in the common circumstance of the group.
The verbal sound becomes a new component of that shared circumstance, with 
a relevant characteristic: as well as the visual perspective changes profoundly from 
each of the persons implicated in the common task, the sound involves the percep-
tual field of every component of the group equally. So, this sound, that is closely 
associated to the vital fact in course, becomes commonly significant. The sound 
acquires meaning with the result that a verbal sign emerges.
The shared pragmatic field derives in a shared sign that, finally, constitutes a 
shared ontology by the linguistic nature of the human mind. Precisely, it is due to 
the common transcendental structure that we humans share that the shared prag-
matic and semantic fields can become a common ontology. This common ontology 
is no other than the “common sense.”
Every culture and epoch has a common sense, whose components are group’s 
shared pragmatic fields. They constitute the ontology, the semantic base of their 
language, in other words: the reality for that human group.
2.2.8 Mental signs: aliens in the common sense
The medical rationality has constructed the conceptual object of “disease.” A 
disease is a component of the pragmatic field, at list in contemporary occidental 
human groups. The infective diseases conformed the classical paradigm of diseases, 
which Thomas Sydenham in seventieth century contributes to fix as “natural spe-
cies.” So, disease is a reified conceptual object that the physician tries to perceive 
and recognize looking for several physical, laboratory, radiological, or biological 
indices. In the classical clinical theory, a sign is a data obtained in the clinical explo-
ration that means that a disease can be present.
Since psychiatry is a medical speciality, it shares the method that looks for signs 
of diseases. But, in this case, the signs come not from the visual, tactile, or sound 
perception. The psychiatrist detects signs by a method that, somehow, “perceives” 
the mental subjectivity of the patient through the enquiry for a sense in the motor 
and verbal behavior of the patient in a concrete context. The sharing of a common 
sense between a psychiatrist and a patient coming from the same language com-
munity, culture, and epoch, makes it possible to detect mental states which are “out 
from the shared field of the common sense.” When it is supposed that it is because 
a body disease exists, affecting the mechanism of the mind, the psychiatrist judges 
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that a psychiatric disease is present. When the psychiatrist, or the clinical psycholo-
gist, judges that the biological mechanism of the brain is normally functioning, 
even though the patient is out of the common sense, a psychiatric disorder without 
disease is present.
The concept of mental sign is necessary if we accept that psychiatry is medicine. 
Clerambault’s mental automatism is a classic example of that perspective. So, the 
main diagnostic task of the clinical psychiatrist is to detect the presence, or not, of 
several mental signs that lead to a diagnosis. In terms of Jaspers, the mental signs 
can be explained but cannot be understood. Therefore, we can characterize any 
mental sign as “xenopatic,” namely “an alien” in the common sense.
2.2.9 The clinical neurophenomenological method: revisiting psychiatry
Taking in account Sections 2.2.1 to 2.2.8, in other work [46], we have proposed 
the technical steps to follow in the applying of the termed “clinical neurophenom-
enological method”. It consists in:
1. To adopt a phenomenological matrix model:
a. to adopt a system of temporal and space anthropological attributes;
b. to adopt a system of brain’s associative neural networks;
c. to adopt a correlation’s matrix between anthropological attributes and 
neural networks.
2. To define the personal field’s matrix:
a. to determine the concrete temporal attributes of the matrix in that 
patient;
b. to determine the concrete special attributes of the matrix in that patient.
3. To reduce the symptom to a lived experience:
a. focalizing the symptom in zero-person;
b. reducing the symptom to lived experience by adopting in second-person 
perspective of the patient;
c. placing the lived experience in the correspondent cell at the personal matrix.
4. Understanding analyses of the lived experience:
a. to active, by means of introspection, the correspondent cell in the phe-
nomenologist’s personal field;
b. to empathically understand the lived experience in first-person;
c. contrasting with the patient the sense of the lived experience;
d. replacing in the matrix the lived experience, if necessary, attending to the 
new information after contrasting the information with the patient.
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5. Psychopathological analyses:
a. detecting positive mental signs;
b. detecting negative mental signs;
c. detecting secondary psychopathological organizers, which patients 
construct to stabilize his or her psychopathological system;
d. to postulate the neural network which is implied in the positive and nega-
tive signs and, if the case, the subjacent brain connectivity pathology.
6. Therapeutic dialog:
a. facilitating the mental sign’s symbolization by means of a psychothera-
peutic dialog;
b. supporting the patient in the adaptative modulation of his or her psycho-
pathological organizers;
c. to propose new organizers in the personal field, which were based in the 
common sense.
2.2.10 Therapeutic dialog: back to the common sense
If mental signs are understandable, the task of psychotherapy is to cover these 
“alien to the self” experiences by a narrative which could be shared, at least, by two 
people: the patient and the psychotherapist. By the fact of being shared, the patho-
logical experience begins to be covered by a “semantic covering.”
Note that, then, the psychiatrist’s task is double and bidirectional, as already 
pointed Jaspers with his methodological pluralism [5]. He or she must, as a physi-
cian, attend to the biologically explainable, but do not understandable, of the 
mental experience. Also, they, as a psychotherapist, must help in covering the 
experience of the patient with a unitary and shared sense. With this anthropological 
perspective, Giovanni Stanghellini [17] has developed a rigorous psychotherapeutic 
method we based in: the phenomenological hermeneutic dialectic (PHD) method, 
to which the reader is referred.
In view of the above, we can define in easy terms neuroscience-based anthropo-
logical psychiatry (NBAP) as a medical-psychotherapeutic specialty.
3. Conclusions
Psychiatry is a medical-psychotherapeutic speciality. In this chapter, it has been 
proposed that the psychotherapeutic dialog is the technique we can use to progres-
sively cover with successive layers of common sense the alien mental signs that 
presents in the lived experience of the patient. This technique is complementary to 
the medical intervention of diagnose and pharmacological and physical treatment 
of the body diseases which affects the normal brain functioning. To the study of 
brain functioning, in addition to laboratory, neuroimage, and neurophysiological 
technics, the clinical neurophenomenologist uses the specific method of explor-
ing the enactive functioning of the patient’s brain. In this task, to achieve a shared 
semantics in the patient-physician anthropological encounter is necessary.
Psychopathology - An International and Interdisciplinary Perspective
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Medicine is a complex art. It needs the collaboration of the biological and social 
sciences. But a rigorous philosophical foundation is also necessary for psychiatry.
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